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INTRODUCTION
The STS-44 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report is a summary of the vehicle
subsystem operations during the forty-fourth flight of the Space Shuttle Program
and the tenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Atlantis (OV-I04). In addition to
the Atlantis vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an External Tank (ET)
designated as ET-53 (LWT-46); three Space Shuttle main engines (SSME's) (serial
numbers 2015, 2030, and 2029 in positions i, 2, and 3, respectively); and two
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) designated as BI-047. The lightweight redesigned
'4 Solid Rocket Motors (RSRM's) installed in each one of the SRB's were designated
as 360L019A for the left SRB and 360W019B for the right SRB.
" This report satisfies the Level II Space Shuttle Program requirement, as
documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E, which requires each major
organization supporting the Space Shuttle Program to report the results of its
evaluation of the mission and identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objective of the STS-44 mission was to successfully deploy the
Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite/inertial
upper stage (IUS) into a 195 nmi. earth orbit at an inclination of
28.45 degrees. Secondary objectives of this flight were to perform all
operations necessary to support the requirements of the Terra Scout, Military
Man in Space (M88-I), Air Force Maui Optical System Calibration Test (AMOS),
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM), Shuttle Activation
Monitor (SAM), Radiation Monitoring Equipment-Ill (RME-III), Visual Function
Tester-I (VFT-I), and the Interim Operational Contamination Monitor (10CM)
secondary payloads/experiments.
The sequence of events for the STS-44 mission is shown in Table I, and the
official Orbiter Problem Tracking List is presented in Table II. In addition,
each Orbiter subsystem anomaly is discussed in the applicable subsystem section
of the report, and a reference to the assigned tracking number is provided.
Official ET, SRB, and SSME anomalies are also discussed in their respective
sections of the report and the MSFC-assigned tracking number is also shown.
The crew for this forty-fourth Space Shuttle flight was Frederick D. Gregory,
Col., USAF, Commander; Terence T. Henricks, Col., USAF, Pilot; James S. Voss,
Lt. Col.,USA, MissionSpecialisti; F. StoryMusgrave,Ph.D.,Mission
Specialist 2; Mario Runco, Jr., Lt. Cmdr., USN, Mission Specialist 3; and Thomas
J. Hennen, CWO, USA, Payload Specialist. STS-44 was the third flight for the
Commander, the fourth flight for Mission Specialist 2, and the first flight for
the remaining four crew members.
MISSION SUMMARY
The first launch attempt occurred on November 19, 1991, but the attempt was
scrubbed because of erratic operation of the inertial upper stage (IUS)
redundant inertial measurement unit (RIMU). The RIMU was removed, replaced, and
the launch of the STS-44 vehicle occurred at 328:23:44:00.006 G.m.t.
(6:44:00 p.m.e.s.t.) from launch pad A at KSC on November 24, 1991, with a
total vehicle weight of 4,522,272 lb. Lift-off occurred 13 minutes later than
planned because of a liquid oxygen stop-flow condition that was required to
correct a ground facility liquid oxygen replenish valve leak.
Main engine cutoff (MEC0) occurred at 328:23:52:29.72 G.m.t. The ET was
separated satisfactorily at the planned time. The first orbital maneuvering
subsystem (OMS-I) maneuver was not planned nor conducted because of the direct
insertion trajectory that was flown. Ignition for the OMS-2 maneuver occurred
at 329:00:24:48.23 G.m.t., and cutoff occurred at 329:00:27:52.02 G.m.t. The
183.79-second maneuver imparted a differential velocity of 286.1 ft/sec.
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and launch phase
performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance
was normal with SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact occurring
as anticipated. Performance of the SSME's, ET, and main propulsion system
(MPS) was also normal.
An examination of prelaunch and flight data shows that all Orbiter, SRB, ET, and
SSME subsystems performed properly during ascent, and all launch objectives were
accomplished. A determination of the vehicle performance was made using vehicle
acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the
average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) determined for the time
period between SRB separation and the start of 3-g throttling was 451.4 seconds.
The DSP/IUS satellite deployment occurred successfully at 329:06:03 G.m.t.
Following the successful deployment, the 0MS-3 maneuver was performed at
329:06:17:46.5 G.m.t. This maneuver was 16.4 seconds in duration and imparted a
differential velocity of 30.2 ft/sec.
The two DSP/IUS burns were successfully completed with nominal results, and the
DSP was inserted into a geosynchronous orbit.
For the first time on a Shuttle flight, the water cooling loop bypass valve
temperature controller was placed in the automatic position. The performance of
the valve in the automatic mode was satisfactory. With the water bypass valve
in the automatic position, the crew was able to maintain more acceptable cabin
temperatures than on previous missions.
After supply water dumps 2 and 4, data indicated internal leakage through the
supply water dump valve. An IFM procedure was successfully performed after
supply water dump 4 to isolate and purge the supply water dump line with cabin
air. The remaining supply water dumps were made through the FES.
A 7-second retrograde reaction control subsystem (RCS) firing was performed at
332:22:10 G.m.t. to avoid space debris (Cosmos 851) that would be near the
Orbiter during the following sleep period.
At 334:15:14 G.m.t., the inertial measurement unit (IMU) 2 registered
redundant-rate and velocity-fail BITE indications. Subsequently, IMU 2 was
"voted" failed by redundancy management software. The IMU was taken to standby,
then operate, and the power was cycled, all in an unsuccessful attempt to
recover the IMU. This failure invoked the flight rule requiring a minimum
duration flight for loss of one IMU.
As a result of the IMU 2 failure and the decision to perform a minimum duration
mission, the RCS hot-fire was performed, beginning at 334:20:55 G.m.t. All
thrusters were fired twice and exhibited nominal performance.
Following the RCS hot-fire test, the flight control system (FCS) checkout was
satisfactorily performed at 334:21:19:05.76 G.m.t. APU 2 ran for 8 minutes
43.15 seconds during the checkout, and approximately 20 lb of fuel was consumed.
The payload bay doors were closed at 335:18:46:55.49 G.m.t. The crew completed
experiment operations, as well as entry preparations and stowage. Ignition for
"o the deorbit maneuver occurred at 335:21:28:16.22 G.m.t. The maneuver was
183.O1 seconds in duration and the differential velocity was 355.6 ft/sec.
Entry interface occurred at 335:22:03:23 G.m.t.
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at Edwards Air Force Base lakebed runway 5
at 335:22:34:42.77 G.m.t. Nose landing gear touchdown occurred 8 seconds later
with wheels stop at 335:22:36:28.7 G.m.t. Preliminary indications are that the
rollout was normal in all respects with the crew not applying brakes until the
Orbiter speed reached 15 knots. The flight duration was 6 days 22 hours
52 minutes 28 seconds. The APU's were shut down by 335:22:52:15.39 G.m.t., and
the crew completed the required postflight reconfigurations and departed the
Orbiter landing area at 335:23:27 G.m.t.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
The vehicle performance section of this report contains a discussion of the
various subsystems of the SRB and RSRM, ET, SSME, and the Orbiter vehicle
(Atlantis).
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTOR
All SRB systems performed as expected throughout ascent. The SRB prelaunch
countdown was normal. RSRM propulsion performance was well within the required
specification limits, and the propellant burn rate for each RSRM was normal.
RSRM thrust differentials during the buildup, steady-state, and tailoff phases
were well within specifications. All SRB thrust vector control prelaunch
conditions and flight performance requirements were met with ample margins. All
electrical functions were performed properly. Five SRB/RSRM anomalies were
identified during the data review and postflight visual inspection of the
hardware. No SRB or RSRM launch commit criteria (LCC) or Operations and
Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document (OMRSD) violations occurred.
Power-up and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters was
accomplished routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable
limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, the heated ground purge in
the SRB aft skirt was powered up and maintained the case/nozzle joint
temperature within the required LCC ranges. On November 19, 1991, the aft skirt
gaseous nitrogen purge heater failed during the first power-up at L-12 hours and
24 minutes. The heater was repaired and functioned normally following
activation on November 24 at L-10 hours and 51 minutes.
The flightperformanceof bothRSRM'swas wellwithintheallowableperformance
envelopesand was typicalof the performanceobservedon previousflights. The
followingtableprovidesdata for the primarypropulsionparameters.
RSRM PROPULSIONPERFORMANCE
Parameter Left motor, 73 °F Right motor, 73 °F
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
..
Impulse ga_es
1-20, 106 lbf-sec 65.39 64.53 65.53 64_33
1-60, 106 lbf-sec 174.42 173.02 174.75 172.65
I-AT, I0 Ibf-sec 296.83 i296.45 297.07 297.24
Vacuum Isp, ibf-sec/ibm 268.5 268.2 268.5 268.7
Burn rate, in/see 0.3671 0.3650 0.3673 0.3642
Event times, seconds
Ignition interval 0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A
Web time II0.i 110.8 II0.0 111.5
Action time 122.5 123.4 121.8 123.5
Separation cue, 50 psia 119.9 121.4 119.7 120.9
PMBT, °F 73.0 73.0 73.0 73.0
Maximum ignition rise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
psi/lO ms
Decay time, seconds 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.4
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff imbalance Predicted Actual
Impulse differential, N/A 634.7
klbf-sec
D
The SRB flight structural temperature response was as expected. Postflight
inspection of the recovered hardware indicated that the SRB thermal protection
system performed properly during ascent with very little acreage ablation.
Separation subsystem performance was normal with all booster separation motors
expended and all separation bolts severed. Nose cap jettison, frustum
separation, and nozzle jettison occurred normally on each SRB.
Both SRB's were successfully separated from the ET at 126.6 seconds after
lift-off. The entry and deceleration sequence was properly performed on both
SRB's. RSRM nozzle jettison occurred after frustum separation, and subsequent
parachute deployments were successfully performed.
During the SRB recovery operations, the retrieval team reported structural
damage to the left SRB forward skirt, systems tunnel, and External Tank Attach
(ETA) ring (Flight Problem STS-44-B-I). Varying degrees of structural damage
were also observed on the left RSRM forward and forward center motor segments,
as well as the aft and forward ET flanges. The postflight inspection revealed
major structural damage to the following areas:
a. The forward skirt was buckled over a 150-degree circumferential distance,
from the +Z axis through the systems tunnel (-Y axis) on toward the -Z
axis. Cracks were observed around the buckled areas ranging from 8 inches
to 19 inches across.
b. The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) antenna was missing from the
. +Z axis side. The antenna found later floating nearby in the ocean and it
was retrieved.
c. The left SRB systems tunnel forward feed-through cover closeout was
cracked on the -Z side. The first cover was severely damaged in the area
of the forward skirt buckle. The K5N_ closeout was missing from between
covers 4 and 5. Cover 6 had a 4 in_ area divot with a clean substrate,
and the aft end of cover 12 was buckled and fasteners on the -Z side were
broken.
d. The left SRB ETA ring was buckled along all segments of the forward and
aft webs with ring caps cracked and numerous fasteners either broken or
missing. The failed fasteners are located on either side of the +Z and -Z
axes. The ring was also separated from the web at several locations
circumferentially.
All of the left SRB damage was mapped and the data were supplied to the anomaly
investigation team. Postflight investigations assured that there were no ascent
or separation conditions that might have contributed to these observations, and
thus there are no flight safety issues or constraints for subsequent flights.
All observed damage is attributed to loads imposed on the SRB at water
impact/slapdown as a result of high winds and sea conditions in the recovery
area.
Only two descent phase loads exist that could cause SRB structural damage;
drogue parachute deployment and water impact/slapdown. It is improbable that
the drogue parachute deployment loads caused the damage as the STS-44
ninety ninth percentile load case could not generate the loads required to cause
this failure; therefore, the most probable cause of the failure was conditions
that occurred at water impact/slapdown.
I
In addition to the left SRB damage, the left RSRM exhibited varying degrees of
structural damage on the forward and forward center segments, as well as the aft
and forward ET flanges (Flight Problem STS-44-M-I). The left RSRM forward
segment had visible case deformation on the aft cylinders at two locations, and
the center forward segment had visible damage at five locations. Outer ligament
cracks existed on the forward ET flange at 211 degrees and on the aft flange at
212 degrees. The holes were elongated on the outboard side. Visual deformation
existed on both ET flanges at approximately 330 degrees. The forward flange is
bent approximately 0.20-inch aft over a span of 5 degrees. The aft flange is
bent approximately 0.12-inch forward over a span of 4 degrees.
5
The major buckling damage at approximately station 980 was caused by a bending
load on the motor. A bending moment of over 500,000,000 in-lb is required to
buckle the case. The parachute loads can generate a maximum load of less that
200,000,000 in-lb, assuming the worst case loading condition. No identified
preflight or flight load can cause a significant bending moment at this
location. No damage occurred on the aft end of the motor (stiffener segments,
aft dome, nozzle, and aft skirt), suggesting that the aft end of the motor did
not hit the water in a normal vertical attitude. As a result of the analysis,
previous experience, and the physical evidence, it was concluded that the damage
occurred after motor operation and the most likely scenario is that the damage
was the result of water impact. ."
_ .o
The postflight inspection of the left SRB also revealed that the aft booster
separation motor (BSM) system A firing-line cable connector had two recessed d
socket contacts (Flight Problem STS-44-B-3). The functional integrity of the
cable was verified through the launch countdown. The anomalous connector was
found in line with the ETA ring damage, and the cable was pushed inward and the
tie wrap was broken. The cable had functioned properly during STS-44 as well as
four previous missions. A postflight continuity test was performed with normal
readings, confirming that continuity had been maintained. A teardown analysis,
including a Scanning Electron Microscope analysis, determined that the retainer
clips were damaged during cable manufacture. The analysis also showed that the
damage was due to a ductile overload. In addition, the analysis shows that the
cable design precludes loss of continuity due to recessed contacts.
Postflight analysis revealed that during the lift-off sequence, tensile strains
were recorded from the right SRB aft-skirt post-4 critical welds which measured
outside the maximum tensile strain data base (Flight Problem STS-44-B-2). The
maximum post-4 tensile strain was measured to be 5,552 micro strain compared
with a maximum of 5,072 micro-strain measured during STS-34. The mobile launch
platform measured loads revealed that the flight loads were within expected
values. No visual damage was detected during the postflight inspection of the
hardware.
During the postflight inspection of the right RSRM nozzle cowl and outer boot
ring (OBR), abnormal erosion patterns/wash areas were noted (Flight Problem
STS-44-M-2). The right RSRM nozzle had material missing on the aft end of the
cowl ring insulation and the forward end of the OBR. The abnormal
operational/erosion wash areas at the aft end of the nozzle cowl were more
extensive than previously observed. The greatest concern for this condition is
its effect on the cowl/OBR bondline integrity and the subsequent reduced flex o
bearing protection. The maximum radial depth on the nozzle cowl was i0 percent
deeper than that experienced on STS-39 where this anomaly occurred previously.
Also, the cowl wedgeouts from STS-44 were incurred for approximately 360 degrees
in comparison to 130 degrees on STS-39. The depth of the eroded/rounded
surfaces on STS-44 also indicated that the wedgeouts occurred during motor
operation. An assessment of the deepest postburn wedgeout area (at
approximately 36 degrees) of the cowl established a positive margin of safety.
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EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and
flight operations were met. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation
performed satisfactorily. ET purge and heater operations were monitored and all
performed properly. No LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
As expected, only the normal ice/frost formations for the November atmospheric
environment were observed during the countdown. No frost or ice was present on
the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present on
"- the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen feedlines and on the pressurization line
_rackets. A small amount of frost was also present along the liquid hydrogen
protruding air load (PAL) ramps. All of these observations were acceptable
. based on NSTS 08303. The Ice/Frost Red Team reported that no anomalous TPS
conditions existed.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum liquid oxygen ullage pressure experienced during the period
of the ullage pressure slump was 14.1 psid.
The ET tumble system was deactivated for this flight. ET separation was
completed on time, main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred within the expected
tolerances, and ET entry and breakup occurred within the predicted footprint.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All SSME parameters were normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and were
typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. Engine ready was
achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and thrust
buildup were normal.
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during engine start, and during
thrust buildup, mainstage, throttling, shutdown, and propellant dumping
operations was well within specification. High pressure oxidizer turbopump
(HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures appeared to be
well within specification throughout engine operation.
The SSME controllers provided the proper control of the engines throughout
powered flight and no failures were indicated. Engine dynamic data generally
compared well with previous flight and test data. All on-orbit activities
associated with the SSME's were accomplished successfully.
There were no significant SSME problems identified; however, a main combustion
" chamber (MCC) pressure measurement bias of 35 psi existed on main engine 2 for
the first 270 seconds following engine start with a consequence that thrust and
mixture ratio on that engine was approximately -0.6-percent low during that
interval (Flight Problem STS-44-E-I). This condition resulted in SSME 2
operating at 103.4-percent power level until the bias disappeared at
approximately 270 seconds. The postflight analysis suggested that the most
likely cause was a partial blockage of the channel B transducer sense passage by
contaminant. The anomaly cleared when the contaminant cleared from the sense
tube. The postflight hardware inspection revealed a gel-like contamination in
the channel B transducer seal at joint G8.8. Analysis of the contaminant most
closely resembled a mercaptan epoxy, which is used for several applications on
the SSME but not at this joint. A special inspection revealed that all other
flight-engine transducer installations were free of contaminants.
Also during the postflight film review, a small fire was observed in the area of
the aft manifold of SSME 2 (ser. no. 2030) just prior to lift-off. A small cold
wall nozzle leak is suspected. A large experience base exists with nozzle cold
wall leaks which occur during ground testing. A postflight leak check of the
aft manifold will be performed to repair any existing leaks.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM -"
Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS
measurements indicated that the system performance was satisfactory throughout
the flight with the system signal strength remaining above the specified minimum
of -97 dBM for the duration of the flight.
Prior to SRB separation, the SRB S&A devices were safed and SRB system power was
turned off, as planned. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITER VEHICLE SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was excellent. Liquid hydrogen loading was
performed as planned with no stop flows or reverts. A liquid oxygen revert and
stop flow condition occurred during the replenish cycle to allow time for the
Red Team to retorque a leaking facility replenish valve. Liquid oxygen
replenish was resumed about 2 hours 25 minutes after initiation of the revert.
The leak did not recur. This condition was the cause of the 13-minute delay in
the launch.
An OMRSD violation occurred when the liquid oxygen T-O umbilical cavity purge
circuit A pressure measured 690 psia. The requirement is 750 + 50 psia. A
waiver was written with the rationale being that the circuit A-pressure was
sufficient and circuit B was operating normally and in parallel with circuit A.
Loading of liquidhydrogen was completed during the launch countdown and no
problems were noted. _
At 328:15:43:45 G.m.t., about 20 minutes into the liquid oxygen fast fill of the
ET and approximately 8 hours prior to launch, liquid oxygen temperature sensor A •
on the 17-inch disconnect/manifold began operating erratically (off-scale low
readings) (Flight Problem STS-44-V-01). About I0 minutes later, the sensor
began displaying a steady off-scale low condition. The sensor then began
operating nominally about 2 hours later; however, one 40-second period of
erratic behavior was again noted, beginning at 328:18:02:20 G.m.t. Following
this condition, the sensor operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the
countdown and through the MPS dump sequence following ascent.
Throughout the preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations
were detected in the aft compartment. The maximum hydrogen concentration in the
Orbiter aft compartment was 190 ppm (corrected), which compares well with
previous data for this vehicle. Early in the liquid hydrogen topping process,
two indications of high hydrogen concentrations existed in the ground umbilical
carrier plate (GUCP) area. These concentrations remained high for approximately
45 minutes, reaching a maximum value of about 31,000 ppm. This was not an LCC
violation since the maximum limit is 44,000 ppm. The hydrogen concentration
level was within nominal limits at lift-off.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish cycle
versus the inventory loads resulted in a loading accuracy of -0.0561 percent for
liquid hydrogen and -0.11 percent for liquid oxygen. The liquid oxygen load was
low because only 45 minutes of stable replenish was performed after coming out
of liquid oxygen revert period.
Ascent MPS performance was normal. Data indicate that the liquid hydrogen and
oxygen pressurization systems performed as planned and that all net positive
suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. MECO
occurred 509.714 seconds after SRB ignition.
STS-44 was the second flight of the gaseous oxygen fixed orifice flow control
valve on OV-104 and the fourth flight for the Shuttle Program. The minimum
liquid oxygen ullage pressure experienced during the countdown ullage pressure
slump was 14.1 psid. The postflight analysis of performance showed that the
valves operated properly. The gaseous hydrogen pressurization system also
performed nominally.
During on-orbit operations, the SSME I helium decay rate was 0.274 lb/day, which
was above the specification limit of 0.26 lb/day. As a result of the normal
turnaround testing, SSME I midbody Helium tank 7 was found to be leaking above
allowable limits. The tank was replaced and as a result, the on-orbit decay
rate is expected to be within specification during future flights.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performed nominally throughout the mission. The RCS was used to support
Development Test Objective (DTO) 242 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test,
although the automatic portion of the second and third programmed test input
(PTI) as well as the entire fourth PTI were not performed. The RCS was also
used to participate in the Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test.
Propellant consumption for the mission was 5048 lb, which includes the
propellant dumped from the forward RCS module during entry operations.
• The threeplannedRCS maneuversand one unplannedRCS maneuverwereperformed
" with nominal subsystem operation. The first maneuver, FRCS-I, was a 7-second
-X axis firing using primary thrusters FIF and F2F. The second maneuver,
ARCS-I, was a 75-second +X axis firing using primary thrusters L3A and R3A.
The third maneuver, FRCS-2, consisted of a series of 12 pulses with primary
thrusters F3D and F4D along with a 30-second firing of thrusters FIF and F2F.
The unplanned debris-avoidance maneuver was a 7-second +X axis firing using
thrusters L3A and R3A.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The OMS performed nominally throughout the STS-44 mission, during which three
two-engine maneuvers were performed. The total firing time of the engines for
the three maneuvers was 383.20 seconds with 14,743 lb of propellant consumed.
No OMS-RCS interconnect operations were performed during this mission.
OMS operations Configuration Burn length, sec Differential velocity,
ft/sec
OMS-2 Dual engine 183.79 286.1
OMS-3 Dual engine 16.4 30.2
Deorbit Dual engine 183.01 355.6
Three minor OMS problems were noted during the mission, none of which had an
impact on the mission. The OMS aft fuel high-point bleed temperature
(V43T6238A) increased to 95 °F (expected temperature of 87 °F) during prelaunch
operations. Data indicate that both the A and B system heaters were on
simultaneously. This condition has been noted during previous missions and is
not considered an anomaly.
The right OMS engine bi-propellant valve transducer indication remained at a
constant value of 94.6 percent (specification = i00 +5 percent) during the OMS-2
engine firing. This condition has been noted on two-previous missions and is
normal performance for this transducer. This transducer was replaced prior to
the STS-27 mission, but the transducer was not calibrated after the
installation.
The crew noted a left OMS low quantity indication at the end of the deorbit
maneuver. The aft quantity decreased to less than 5 percent for a brief period
during the firing, and a low quantity indication under this condition is normal
subsystem operation.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The performance of the power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem
was nominal throughout the mission. The vehicle was flown in the four-tank-set
configuration, and a total of 183 lb of hydrogen and 1,525.3 lb of oxygen was
consumed during the mission, including 72.3 lb oxygen consumed by the crew. A ""
mission extension capability of 154 hours at an average power level of 12.8
kilowatts remained at landing.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell performance was nominal throughout the mission. The total
electrical energy produced was 2,138 kwh at an average power level of 12.8 kW
and 413 amperes. The fuel cells consumed 183 lb of hydrogen and 1,453 lb of
oxygen and produced 1,636 lb of water. Fuel cell 1 is the fleet leader in
operational time and will approach the certified life of 2,000 hours during the
next mission of OV-I04, which is STS-45.
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The fuel cell 1 hydrogen and fuel cell 3 oxygen flowmeters were biased low
on-orblt (approximately 70 percent of normal reading), but returned to normal
readings after landing. Fuel cell flowmeters have a history of erratic
behavior; therefore, this off-nominal performance poses no concern for future
operation of these fuel cells.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout the mission, although two
anomalies were noted. The following table presents the operating time and fuel
"
usage by the APU's during the mission.
- APU i (S/N 203) APU 2 (S/N 208) APU 3 (S/N 307)
Flight Phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
Ib Ib ib
_scent 18:31 41 18:32 49 18:31 47
FCS checkout 08:43 20
Entry 89:06 147 62:02 157 62:00 129
Totala 107:37 188 89:17 226 80:31 176
a The total includes 17 minutes 39 seconds of APU operation after landing.
At 333:04:38 G.m.t., the APU 2 fuel pump drain line pressure decreased to
3.5 psia from 15 psia over a 75-minute period (Flight Problem STS-44-V-IO).
During preflight operations, the drain line had been vented twice because of
static leakage from the fuel pump manifold into the seal cavity, and a waiver was
processed for this condition. This APU was used for the flight control system
checkout, and no anomalous conditions were noted nor was any further leakage noted
from the drain line system. This condition is indicative of a leaky seal cavity
drain system relief valve and has been observed on other APU's on previous
flights. A postflight leak check revealed no external hydrazine leakage. The
relief valve will be replaced with a redesigned valve. This anomaly did not
impact the mission.
About 20 minutes after APU 2 start during entry, the APU 2 seal cavity drain
line temperature 2 measurement (V46TO270A) increased from III °F to 170 °F in
8 seconds, then dropped to 155 °F. Two minutes later, the temperature increased
from 156 °F to 196 °F in II seconds, tripping the 195 °F fault detection
annunciator (FDA) set-point (Flight Problem STS-44-V-II). The temperature then
" immediately began a slow decrease to an acceptable level of I00 °F. As a
result, no action was taken to turn the heaters off because of the dropping
temperature. A warm slug of fuel is suspected to have migrated near the
temperature sensor and this was coupled with a heater-on cycle, causing the FDA
message. The anomaly did not impact the mission.
Also shortly before landing, the APU I gas generator valve module (GGVM)
temperature i measurement increased to about 155 °F (about 20 °F above the
Ii
expected temperature), which was not outside the established limits. This
temperature signature has been observed on previous flights of the OV-104
vehicle (STS-37, STS-38, and STS-36) with APU's in position I.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout
the mission with one anomaly and a number of minor irregularities identified.
The water spray boiler (WSB) 2 ready indication was lost 16 minutes prior to APU
start for ascent because the steam vent temperature dropped below 130 °F. The -"
condition has been noted on many previous missions and is an understood and
acceptable response. This condition occurred on the previous flight of this
vehicle.
During ascent, WSB 2 gaseous nitrogen regulator relief valve cracking pressure
was 35.08 psig and should have been no greater than 33.5 psig. As a result, the
relief valve crack in-flight checkout requirement was not met. Data analysis
indicates that the WSB system operated nominally, and the transducer momentarily
delayed its response. This same type of response was seen with this sensor on
STS-37 and was attributed to contamination of the transducer resistive element
that inhibited brush arm movement.
Hydraulic system 3 main pump pressure momentarily decreased approximately
140 psi in approximately 1.2 seconds during APU 3 shutdown following ascent.
The decrease occurred at approximately 55 percent APU speed and then recovered
completely before following a normal decay rate. This same condition was noted
twice during APU 3 shutdown following landing. The initial data review from
this and a previous OV-104 flight indicates that this may be a peculiarity of
this system; however, data review and evaluation continues.
WSB vent heater system 2 required I hour 9 minutes to raise the vent temperature
above 123 °F (off-scale low), whereas system 1 and 3 required 25 minutes to
achieve 123 °F during the post-ascent ice removal process. Numerous incidents
of similar heater operation have been noted during the last five flights of this
vehicle. This problem did not affect subsystem operation during the mission.
When APU i was switched from low to normal at approximately entry interface
minus 13 minutes, an out-of-specification delay in priority valve 1 cracking was
observed (Flight Problem STS-44-V-13). Cracking required 1.039 seconds, and the
specification requires almost instantaneous but no more than 1.0 second of time 4-
for cracking. Previous occurrences of this condition have been attributed to
accumulator-generated contamination in the bootstrap system. The valve was
replaced with a newly redesigned valve during turnaround activities at KSC.
Pyrotechnics Subsystem
The pyrotechnics subsystem performed nominally. All ET/Orbiter separation
ordnance device plungers functioned properly. The stop-bolts on the EO-I
separation assembly did not sustain any damage or bending.
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An assembly consisting of an ordnance connector, NASA standard initiator, and
lockwire fell from the ET/Orbiter liquid hydrogen umbilical cavity upon door
opening (Flight Problem STS-44-V-14). Part numbers on the assembly identify it
as having come from one of the three umbilical separation devices.
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
Atmospheric Revitalization System: The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS)
performed satisfactorily with the exception of water found in the area of
• humidity separator B. At approximately 332:18:35 G.m.t., the crew reported
" observing water around the humidity separator B outlet which appeared to be
emitting water (Flight Problem STS-44-V-05). The crew used towels to absorb the
accumulated water (approximately I to 2 cups). Humidity separator A was
selected and functioned nominally. No water was observed near humidity
separator A during a subsequent check.
The water around humidity separator B occurred when the environmental control
life support system (ECLSS) redundant component check was performed. The
switchover of the cabin temperature controller caused the bypass valve to move
from the cooling position to the full heat position, forcing a slug of water to
the separator at a rate that exceeded the pump capacity. As a precautionary
measure, the crew performed an in-flight maintenance procedure on humidity
separator B, installing a water collection bag around the humidity separator B
outlet.
The water coolant loop bypass valve was operated in the automatic position for
the first time on a Space Shuttle flight. This valve controls the water loop
avionics bay inlet temperature to 63 °F. The performance of this valve was
normal with the valve reacting the most to coolant temperature changes instead
of the cabin temperature controller air bypass valve. The crew reported
comfortable cabin temperatures.
The ARS maintained the carbon dioxide partial pressure below 6.8 mm Hg. The
cabin air temperature peaked at 79 °F, and the relative humidity reached
62.5 percent. The avionics bays i, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures peaked at
106.5 °F, 107.5 °F, and 90 °F, respectively. The avionics bays l, 2, and 3
water coldplate temperatures peaked at 90 °F, 93 °F, and 82.5 °F, respectively.
Pressure Control System: The pressure control systems (PCS) I and 2 were used
to maintain cabin pressure during the flight. All operating parameters remained
within normal operational ranges throughout the flight.
Active Thermal Control System: The active thermal control system (ATCS)
performed nominally throughout the flight. The FES was used to perform two
successful water dumps after a problem was noted with the supply water dump
system. The ammonia boiler system was used after landing and operation was
nominal for the short duration of System B operation while awaiting ground
cooling to be connected.
Supply Water, Waste Management, and Waste Collection Systems: The supply water,
waste management, and waste collection subsystems performed normally throughout
the mission. By the completion of the shortened mission, all of the associated
supply water in-flight checkout requirements were satisfied.
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Supply water was managed throughthe use of the overboarddump system and the
FES. Four supply water dumps were performedat an average dump rate of
1.7 percentper minute (2.8 ib/min). The supplywater dump line temperaturewas
maintainedbetween63 °F and 95 °F throughoutthe missionwith the operationof
the line heater. The system A heatersexperienceda ditheringthermostat.
Shortlyafter completionof the second supply water dump, the supply water dump
line and nozzle temperaturesindicateda momentaryreleaseof water throughthe
dump valve. This behavior is similar to that observedon OV-103 during the
STS-48 mission. The supply water dump valve momentaryleakageoccurred several
additional times followingthe fourthdump (FlightProblemSTS-44-V-06). The -"
crew successfullyperformedan IFM procedureon the supplywater dump llne,
purging it with cabin air. The dump valve remainedclosed for the remainderof
the mission and supply water was dumped throughthe flash evaporatorsystem
(FES).
Waste water was gatheredat about the predictedrate. Two waste water dumps
were performedat an averagerate of 1.93 percent/minute(3.19 ib/min). The
waste water dump line temperaturewas maintainedbetween 57 °F and 76 °F
throughoutthe mission,while the vacuum vent line temperaturewas maintained
between 58 °F and 76 °F.
Smoke Detectionand Fire Suppression: The smoke detectionsystem performed
normally throughoutthe flight,showingno indicationsof smoke being generated.
The fire suppressionsystem was not required.
Airlock SupportSystem: The airlocksupportsystem was not exercisedthis
missionas no extravehicularactivitywas required. The active system monitor
parameters indicatednormal outputs throughoutthe flight.
Avionicsand SoftwareSubsystems
IntegratedGuidance,Navigationand Control: The integratedguidance,
navigationand controlsubsystemperformednominallythroughoutthe mission.
Flight Control: The flight controlsystem performedsatisfactorilythroughout
the missionand was used in performingDTO 242. Resultsof this DTO are
presentedin the DevelopmentTest Objectivesectionof this report.
The STS-44 elevon/bodyflap activityin the Mach 23 region was similar to the
activityobserved on STS-48. This behaviorwas expectedbecause of the position
of the center-of-gravityalong the vehicleX axis.
InertialMeasurementUnit: At 334:15:14G.m.t., the IMU 2 registered
redundant-rateand velocity-failBITE indications. Subsequently,IMU 2 failed
redundancymanagement(FlightProblemSTS-44-V-07). The IMU was taken to
standby, then operate, and the power was cycled,all in an unsuccessfulattempt
to recover the IMU. This failureinvoked the flight rule requiringa minimum
duration flight for loss of one IMU. Data analysisindicate that the failurein
IMU 2 is in the Z-axis accelerometeroutput which was saturatedat 15.22 g's.
The indicated5.77 deg/hr rate on the redundantgyro monitor reflects the
productof the saturatedZ-axis accelerometeroutput and the redundantgyro
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monitor g-sensitivity term. The IMU remained powered up to allow the ground
controllers to monitor IMU 2 attitude information for the remainder of the
mission, but was not used for onboard navigation.
The IMU I performance was nominal. The high accuracy inertial navigation system
(HAINS) improved IMU was installed in position 3 and its performance was
exceptional with drift far below that of IMU i.
Star Tracker: The performance of both star trackers was nominal.
"- Data Processing System/Flight Software: The performance of the data processing
system/flight software was nominal. Because of the IMU 2 failure, a total of
4,094 general purpose computer (GPC) errors were logged in major mode 304/305.
Errors ceased at the Operations 901 transition after landing.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control: The electrical power distribution and
control (EPDC) subsystem performance was nominal except for one instance late in
the mission. At approximately 335:22:26:30 G.m.t. (about 8 minutes before
landing), the left air data probe deployment occurred using only a single ac
motor (Flight Problem STS-44-V-09). The air data probe still operated in less
than the required time. Motor 2 did not operate. The relay controlling motor 2
operation went to the deploy position for 1 second, and then reverted to the
wrong (stow) position for the remainder of the probe travel. This anomaly has
occurred on OV-104 several times during previous turnaround flows and was
attributed to "toggle switch teasing" as no hardware problems have ever been
found.
Displays and Controls: The displays and controls operated nominally throughout
the STS-44 mission except for one anomaly that occurred late in the mission. A
test of the payload bay floodlights was conducted about midway through the
mission and all floodlights were reported to be functioning nominally. The test
was performed as a troubleshooting measure to isolate an intermittent midport
floodlight anomaly that was reported on a previous flight of this vehicle and
was not reproduced in ground tests; however, the problem did not reappear during
this test. Later use of the payload bay floodlights for payload bay door
closure revealed that neither the midport or midstarboard lights were working
properly (Flight Problem STS-44-V-16).
Communications and Tracking
The performance of the communications and tracking subsystem was satisfactory
with two minor anomalies that did not significantly impact the mission.
The crew reported that VIU serial number 1009 failed, and the camcorder would
operate only on battery power (Flight Problem STS-44-V-02). Subsequent
troubleshooting indicated that only the power output from the VIU was
malfunctioning, and that the video signal input was functioning normally. The
normal VIU output voltage level to the camcorder is 7.4 volts, but a multimeter
reading indicated an output of 7.2 volts. An IFM procedure to adjust the output
voltage was available, but was not implemented since a spare VIU was available.
The spare VIU was used with the camcorder and the malfunctioning VIU was used
with an Air Force payload (SPADVOS) which only required the video connection to
the VIU.
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Closed-circuit television (CCTV) camera B contained horizontal white lines which
appeared in low-light situations (Plight Problem STS-44-V-08). This condition
is indicative of a degrading high-voltage power supply circuit in the camera.
This condition was transient and only affected low-light video.
During a pass over the continental United States with operations on both
Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS), the Orbiter experienced a significant
number of signal dropouts on the forward and return links. Analysis of these
dropouts indicated that RFI, not hardware, was the cause of the problem.
The crew reported at 329:01:22 G.m.t., that color television (TV) monitor 2, -"
flown for the first time on a Shuttle flight, did not power up on the first
attempt. On the third attempt to power up the TV, the crew reported that the
monitor was operating properly. This problem did not subsequently repeat or
affect operations being performed at that time.
Operational Instrumentation Subsystem
The operational instrumentation subsystem (OIS) performance was satisfactory
with two anomalies.
While dumping track 1 of OPS recorder 2, the data quality was very poor (Flight
Problem STS-44-V-04). The same data were dumped three times, and all data were
of poor quality when dumped in the reverse direction, and better but not good in
the forward direction. A fourth dump of track 1 on orbit 17 showed poor quality
data when dumping in the reverse direction, but good quality data in the forward
direction. Since track I could not be relied upon to provide usable data,
track I on OPS recorder 2 was no longer used to record data.
An Orbiter problem was noted at 328:15:43:45 G.m.t., approximately 8 hours
prior to launch, when liquid oxygen temperature sensor A on the 17-inch
disconnect/manifold began operating erratically (Flight Problem STS-44-V-01). A
more detailed discussion of the sensor operation is presented in the Main
Propulsion System section of this report.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed satisfactorily. DTO 520 -
Edwards Lakebed Runway Bearing Strength and Rolling Friction Assessment for
Orbiter Landing - was performed with no braking taking place until the Orbiter
decelerated to 15 knots ground speed.
The main gear touchdown occurred at 192.6 knots and nose gear touchdown occurred
at 151.4 knots. The sink rate at main gear touchdown was approximately i ft/sec
and the pitch rate at nose gear touchdown was 4.48 deg/sec. Braking was not
initiated until 15 knots ground speed because DTO 520 was performed.
Consequently, maximum brake pressures during the 12 seconds of brake-on time on
the left main gear was 396 psi and on the right main gear was 624 psi. Brake
energies also were very low as a result of the DTO being performed. Rollout
distance was 11,190 feet. The main landing gear tires were in excellent
condition.
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Postflight disassembly of the brakes revealed two hairline cracks
(1/2 to 3/4 inches in length) in the right inboard brake rotor (Plight Problem
STS-44-V-18). The brake assemblies from all four wheels were removed at KSC and
sent to the vendor for inspection and analysis. Preliminary analysis indicates
that the cracking was caused by over-tightening of the rivets on the rotor. The
manufacturer has stated that this condition was caused by an improper production
line procedure. The procedure has been revised to correct this condition.
Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces
"_ The ascent aerodynamics of the Orbiter vehicle were satisfactory with no
reportable observations.
. The entry aerodynamics of the Orbiter were nominal with control surface
responses and angle-of-attack as expected. The elevon schedule was slightly off
the predicted values and postflight analysis continues.
DTO 242 was performed and a discussion is contained in the DTO section of this
report.
The integrated heating of the Orbiter was nominal during all phases of the
mission.
All thermal interface temperatures were maintained within established limits.
One area of concern arose during the scrub after the first planned launch time.
During the reset-of-purge-pressure operations following the scrub, source
pressures spiked at approximately twice the normal setting. This spike could
have resulted in the loss of seal integrity to the aft compartment. However,
the aft Helium concentration indicated the seals were normal.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem (TCS) was nominal during all
phases of the mission with no thermostat or instrumentation problems identified.
A portable infrared thermometer was used to measure the surface temperatures of
three areas on the Orbiter TPS after landing. Seventeen minutes after wheel
stop, the Orbiter nose cap reusable carbon carbon (RCC) temperature was 183 °F,
and 7 minutes later the right-hand wing leading edge RCC panel 9 was 87 °F, and
the right-hand wing leading edge RCC panel 17 was 73 °F.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating during entry was nominal with local heating normal based on
the preliminary thermal protection subsystem inspection.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performance was nominal, based on
structural temperature response data and some tile surface temperature
measurements. The overall boundary layer transition from laminar to turbulent
flow was symmetric, occurring at 1230 seconds after entry interface.
The postlanding debris inspection of the TPS was conducted on December 4 and 5,
1991, in the mate/demate device at Edwards Air Force Base, CA. The inspection
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revealed that the Orbiter had sustained at total of 109 hits, of which nine had
a major dimension of i inch or greater. This total does not include the
base heat shield peppering that was attributed to main engine vibro-acoustics
and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers with statistics
from 30 previous missions of similar configuration indicates that both the total
number of hits as well as the number of hits with a major dimension of I inch or
greater were less that average. From a debris damage standpoint, the STS-44
flight is considered one of the best of the Space Shuttle Program. The
distribution of hits on the Orbiter does not point to a single source for ascent
debris, but does indicate a shedding of ice and TPS debris from random sources.
The inspection showed that the Orbiter lower surface had a total of 74 hits of
which six had a major dimension of I inch or greater. No lower surface TPS
damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes.
Overall, the external inspections of the reusable carbon carbon (RCC) parts
revealed nominal flight performance. The nose landing gear door TPS was in good
condition with the exception of the forward right-hand corner tile which
exhibited damage. Removal and replacement of the nose landing gear door tile is
required. The main landing gear door thermal barriers were in good condition.
The elevon-elevon gap tiles were in good condition, with minor gap filler
degradation.
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The main engine
closeout blankets were in good condition with the only observed damage being
minor fraying from the 5 to 6 o'clock position on SSME i and a 6-inch long
detached outboard blanket edge on SSME 2 at the 5 o'clock position.
The ET door thermal barrierts performance was nominal. The condition of the
barrier was excellent. The TPS performance on the upper fuselage, payload bay
doors, upper wings, and OMS pods was nominal.
The forward edge of the side seal between flipper doors I and 2 on the
right-hand inboard elevon was peeled backward approximately 3 inches. Similar
observations have been made on previous missions, and this condition is not
considered a problem.
Orbiter windows I, 2, 5, and 6 were lightly hazed. Uindows 3 and 4 exhibited
moderate to heavy hazing. Laboratory analysis will be performed on samples
taken from all windows.
GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT AND FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
The overall performance of the flight crew equipment was satisfactory, although
two anomalies and one irregularity were noted with the equipment during the
mission.
The second of three crew members that consecutively used the treadmill on flight
day 2 reported a grinding noise from the treadmill. The noise disappeared and
the treadmill run was completed. While the third crew member was using the
treadmill, the noise returned and the treadmill belt exhibited excessive
resistance with the belt becoming jammed shortly afterward (Flight Problem
18
STS-44-V-03). The treadmill was unusable for the remainder of the flight.
Alternate exercise methods were developed that used the treadmill hardware, but
these procedures resulted in breaking the treadmill handle.
The newly developed display driver unit filter (DDU) cleaning tool that was
being flown for the first time failed (Flight Problem STS-44-V-12). The crew
was able to make a temporary repair with gray tape and use the tool for the
remainder of the mission.
At 331:18:14 G.m.t., the crew reported that the Arriflex 16mm motion picture
camera film movement was very slow and that the shutter switch would not
operate. Changing the magazine did not fix the problem. A malfunction
procedure was performed and the crew reported that the camera began operating
properly; however, the shutter switch continued to cause operational problems
throughout the mission.
The crew reported that the video tape recorder (VTR) lid would not fully close,
leaving the lid approximately I/8-inch higher than the case (Flight Problem
STS-44-V-15). The recorder worked well initially; however, a tape jammed on
flight day 2 and the lid had to be pried open to remove the tape. Following
this occurrence, the crew reported that they had to force the tape door down to
allow the recorder to operate properly. This condition did not affect VTR
operations.
During the postflight crew debriefings, Mission Specialist 2 reported that the
pin in his shoulder belt tightening mechanism came out, and tension could not be
maintained (Flight Problem STS-44-V-17). As a result, he reported that a knot
was tied in the strap and this tightened the strap adequately for launch and
landing operations.
PAYLOADS/EXPERIMENTS
The primary objective of this mission was to deploy the Defense Support
Program/Inertial Upper Stage, and this objective was accomplished successfully
as planned. The secondary objectives were to operate several small payloads,
and to perform medical evaluations for the extended-duration Orbiter capability.
DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM
The DSP/IUS satellite detects missile launches and nuclear detonations using
infrared detectors. The DSP was deployed at 329:06:03 G.m.t. The IUS
" transported the DSP to a geosynchronous orbit where functional checkout was
initiated in preparation of full system operation.
TERRA SCOUT
The objective of the Terra Scout secondary experiment was to evaluate the
ability of a specially trained payload specialist to detect specific ground
targets using a variety of visual aids, such as the Spaceborne Direct View
Optical System (SPADVOS). The Terra Scout payload specialist performed numerous
observations that were planned as well as sights of opportunity. The primary
objectives of the experiment were accomplished. During the flight, 29 site
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observations were attempted with 27 sites acquired. Specific target definition
was accomplished over 22 sites_ five sites were obscured by weather, and two
sites were missed because of hardware and timing input errors.
ULTRAVIOLET PLUME INSTRUMENT
The ultraviolet plume instrument (UVPI) experiment uses a low-power atmospheric
compensation experiment (LACE) satellite to observe Orbiter thruster firings.
No UVPI opportunities/intersections occurred during the flight.
MILITARYMAN IN SPACE(M88-I) .*
The military man in space regimen consists of a series of experiments that were
designed to assess the crewmembers' ability to visually observe air, naval, and
ground force operations, and then communicate these observations to the ground.
Three experiments comprised the M88-I:
a. Maritime Observations Experiments in Space (MOSES);
b. Battlefield Surveillance from Space (BATTLEVIEW); and
c. Night Mist.
Numerous target observations were performed, both planned and sites of
opportunity. The primary objectives to acquire and identify targets and relay
this information to ground controllers were accomplished. A payload radio
failure precluded direct Orbiter-to-ground-controller personnel communications.
During the flight, 16 site observations were planned and 16 sites were acquired.
Specific target definition was accomplished over I0 sites, and 6 sites were
obscured by weather.
SHUTTLE ACTIVATION MONITOR
The SAM experiment was used to measure specific types of radioactivity produced
in spacecraft and sensor materials when the materials are exposed to the space
environment. The SAM objectives to gather radiation measurements in various
Orbiter crew compartment locations with different sensing elements were
accomplished. The hardware functioned nominally throughout the mission;
however, minor software anomalies resulted in recording data tape stoppage.
Prompt crew troubleshooting resulted in minimal loss of data and return to
normal operations.
COSMIC RADIATION EFFECTS AND ACTIVATION MONITOR
The CREAM experiment collected data on cosmic ray spectra and intensity within
the Orbiter crew compartment. The CREAM objectives to gather radiation
measurements coincident with the SAM experiment were accomplished. The hardware
functioned nominally throughout the mission.
RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT III
The RME-III measured and recorded the rate and total dosage of ionizing
radiation inside the Orbiter crew compartment. The RME-III objectives to gather
2O
radiation measurements coincident with the SAM and CREAM experiments were
accomplished. After the initial memory module failed, the flight crew replaced
the memory module and subsequent operations were nominal.
AIR FORCE MAUI OPTICAL SITE CALIBRATION TEST
The AMOS uses the Orbiter as a calibration target for ground-based
electro-optical sensors. Three of the four planned observations of the Orbiter
by the Maul ground site were accomplished. The two night RCS tests were
successfully observed; the night FES dump was not observed, but the Orbiter
"- lights were visible; and the twilight nose track observation was canceled
because of an AMOS hardware problem. An additional observation of an Orbiter
. night attitude maneuver was successfully recorded on orbit 21.
VISUAL FUNCTION TESTER-I
The VFT-I experiment measured changes in the visual acuity of the STS-44
crewmembers during flight. The VFT-I experiment hardware functioned nominally,
and all objectives were accomplished.
INTERIM OPERATIONAL CONTAMINATION MONITOR
The IOCM experiment measured contamination in the Orbiter payload bay during all
mission phases. The IOCM sensor modules are mounted on the payload bay sidewall
and are totally automated. The IOCM operated nominally throughout the mission
as evidenced by power usage.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
Eight DTO's were assigned to the STS-44 mission. DTO 242, Entry Aerodynamic
Control Surfaces Test, was not completed in its entirety, and DTO 805, Crosswind
Landing Performance, was not performed because insufficient crosswinds were
present on the runway chosen for landing. Also, DTO 312, ET TPS Performance,
was not performed as the ET could not be photographed because of the darkness.
Ascent Development Test Objectives
DT0 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation.- Data were collected for
. this data-only experiment, and these data will be evaluated by the sponsor.
" After completion of the evaluation, the results will be published by the
sponsor.
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance.- This DTO was not completed because the launch was
made in darkness.
On-0rbit Development Test Objectives
DTO 645 - Combustion Products Analyzer.- Baseline data for this DTO were
collected and are being analyzed by the sponsor.
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DTO 649 - Shuttle Extended-Duration Orbiter Rehydratable Food Package Evaluation
This DTO was accomplished successfully with good results.
Entry/Landing Development Test Objectives
DT0 242 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test.- This DTO was performed, but
not in its entirety. Six of the seven planned programmed test inputs (PTI) were
performed with the no. 4 PTI (Mach 9.5 to 8.5) not being performed. Also, the
automatic portions of PTIts 2 and 3 were not completed. Two manual body flap
maneuvers were also performed; however, these were apparently performed before
the PTI's were complete and this may cause difficulty in reducing the data. -"
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability.- Data were collected for this DTO. The
results of this DTO will be published by the sponsor.
DTO 520 - Edwards Lakebed Runway Bearing Strength and Rolling Friction
Assessment for Orbiter Landing.- This DTO was accomplished by the crew not
applying the brakes until the Orbiter had slowed to 15 knots. The results of
this DTO will be published by the sponsor.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance.- This DTO was not performed as the
crosswind component that existed (low) on the runway used for landing did not
fall within the criteria for this DTO.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
Fourteen detailed supplementary objectives (DSO's) were assigned to the STS-44
mission. Preliminary data indicate that all 14 were accomplished. A listing of
all assigned DS0's follows:
a. DSO 316 - Bioreactor/Flow and Particle Trajectory in Microgravity - All
planned activities were successfully completed plus one additional test.
b. DSO 463 - In-Flight Holter Monitoring - Data were collected during the
preflight, on-orbit, entry, and postlanding phases of the mission.
c. DSO 472 - Intraocular Pressure - Early data for fluid shifts were
recorded, however, late flight data were not recorded due to the
shortened mission.
d. DSO 478 - In-Flight Lower Body Negative Pressure - No protocol
combinations were completed because of the shortened mission.
e. DSO 603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress -
Preflight data were recorded. Data were also collected during entry,
egress and postlanding.
f. DSO 604 - Visual Vestibular Integration as a Function of Adaptation - The
on-orbit data collection was completed by moving the flight day l0
activities to flight day 7. Entry and postflight data were also
collected.
g. DSO 605 - Postural Equilibrium Control During Landing/Egress - Data were
collected during the preflight and postflight periods.
22
h. DSO 608 - Effects of Space Flight on Aerobic and Anaerobic Metabolism at
Rest and During Exercise - Preflight and postflight data were collected;
however, in-flight exercise was optional.
i. DSO 611 - Air Monitoring Instrument Evaluation and Atmosphere
Characterization - Early and mid-flight data were collected; however,
late flight data were lost due to the shortened mission.
j. DSO 613 - Changes in Endocrine Regulation of Orthostatic Tolerance
Following Space Flight - Preflight and postflight data were collected.
k. DSO 614 - Effect of Prolonged Space Flight on Head and Gaze Stability
• During Locomotion - Preflight and postflight data were collected.
I. DSO 901 - Documentary Television - This DTO was accomplished successfully
and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
m. DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - This DTO was
accomplished very satisfactorily and the photography is being reviewed
and evaluated by the sponsor.
n. DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - This DTO was accomplished with
a large number of photographs being taken. The photography is being
reviewed and evaluated by the experiment sponsor.
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND TELEVISION EVALUATION
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY EVALUATION
On launch day, 24 videos (of 24 expected) were screened, and no potential
in-flight anomalies were observed. Following launch day, 63 launch films were
reviewed with no in-fllght anomalies noted. However, a significant event was
noted in the form of an orange vapor, possibly free burning hydrogen, above the
rim of SSME 2 engine on the left side of the bell during the period from SSME
ignition to lift-off. Postflight inspection of the SSME 2 showed no damage that
would cause this type of event.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY EVALUATION
Five landing videos plus NASA Select and an after-landing helicopter view video
were screened. One anomaly was noted; and two items of interest were observed:
a. From the helicopter view, a slight discoloration was seen on the -Z side
of the leading edge of the body flap.
b. Postlanding video revealed a piece of hardware on the ground below the
ET/Orbiter umbilical area (Flight Problem STS-44-V-14). The contingency
debris team reported that the object fell from the liquid hydrogen
umbilical cavity when the ET door was opened after wheels stop. The
object was identified as a pyrotechnic igniter.
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TABLE I.- STS-44 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
APU activation APU-I GG chamber pressure 328:23:39:10.88
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 328:23:39:11.76
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 328:23:39:12.64
SRB HPU activation LH HPU system A start command 328:23:43:32.15
LH HPU system B start command 328:23:43:32.31
RH HPU system A start command 328:23:43:32.43 _
RH HPU system B start command 328:23:43:32.59
Main propulsion Engine 3 start command accepted 328:23:43:53.455
System start Engine 2 start command accepted 328:23:43 53.559
Engine 1 start command accepted 328:23:43:53.694
SRB ignition command SRB ignition command to SRB 328:23:44:00.006
(lift-off)
Throttle up to Engine 3 command accepted 328:23:44:04.136
104 percent thrust Engine 2 command accepted 328:23:44:04.119
Engine 1 command accepted 328:23:44:04.134
Throttle down to Engine 3 command accepted 328:23:44:27.017
73 percent thrust Engine 2 command accepted 328:23:44:27.000
Engine 1 command accepted 328:23:44:27.015
Throttle up to Engine 3 command accepted 328:23:44:56.458
104 percent thrust Engine 2 command accepted 328:23:44:56.441
Engine 1 command accepted 328:23:44:56.456
Maximum dynamic Derived ascent dynamic 328:23:45:06.62
pressure (q) pressure
Both SRM_s chamber LH SRM chamber pressure 328:23:46:00.606
pressure at 50 psi mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure 328:23:46:01.526
mid-range select
End SRM action LH SRM chamber pressure 328:23:46:03.688
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure 328:23:46:03.665
mid-range select
SRB separation command SRB separation command flag 328:23:46:05.07
SRB physical LH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 328:23:46:06.566
separation RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 328:23:46:06.566
Throttle down for Engine 3 command accepted 328:23:51:31.312
3g acceleration Engine 2 command accepted 328:23:51:31.333 ,
Engine 1 command accepted 328:23:51:31.308
3g acceleration Total load factor 328:23:51:32.21
MECO MEC0 command flag 328:23:52:29.72
MECO confirm flag 328:23:52:29.72
ET separation ET separation command flag 328:23:52:47.67
OMS-I ignition Left engine bi-prop valve N/A
position Not performed -
Right engine bi-prop valve direct insertion
position trajectory flown
OMS-I cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve N/A
position Not performed -
Right engine bi-prop valve direct insertion
position trajectory flown
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TABLE I.- STS-44 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (CONCLUDED)
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
APU deactivation APU-I GG chamber pressure 328:23:57:42.24
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 328:23:57:43.77
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 328:23:57:44.34
OMS-2 ignition Left engine bi-prop valve 329:00:24:48.23
position
'° Right engine bi-prop valve 329:00:24:48.22
position
OMS-2 cutoff Left engine bi-prop valve 329:00:27:52.02
. position
Right engine bi-prop valve 329:00:27:52.03
position
Payload bay door open PLBD right open 1 329:01:18:12.57
PLBD left open 1 329:01:19:32.34
DSP/IUS Deployment Voice call 329:06:03
Flight control
system checkout
APU start APU-2 GG chamber pressure 334:21:19:05.76
APU stop APU-2 GG chamber pressure 334:21:27:48.91
Payload bay door close PLBD right close 1 335:18:45:06.07
PLBD left close 1 335:18:46:55.49
APU activation APU-I GG chamber pressure 335:21:23:07.82
for entry APU-2 GG chamber pressure 335:21:50:11.63
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 335:21:50:14.73
Deorbit maneuver Left engine bi-prop valve 335:21:28:16.22
ignition position
Right engine bi-prop valve 335:21:28:16.03
position
Deorbit maneuver Left engine bi-prop valve 335:21:31:19.23
cutoff position
Right engine bi-prop valve 335:21:31:19.03
position
Entry interface Current orbital altitude 335:22:03:23.35
(400K) above reference ellipsoid
Blackout ends Data locked at high sample No blackout
rate
• Terminal area Major mode change (305) 335:22:27.51.67
energy management
Main landing gear LH MLG tire pressure 335:22:34:42.77i
" contact RH MLG tire pressure 335:22:34:42.77
Main landing gear LH MLG weight on wheels 335:22:34:43.64
weight on wheels RH MLG weight on wheels 335:22:34:43.65
Nose landing gear NLG tire pressure 335:22:34:50.63
contact
Nose landing gear NLG WT on Wheels -I 335:22:34:50.77
weight on wheels
Wheels stop Velocity with respect to 335:22:36:28.7
runway
APU deactivation APU-I GG chamber pressure 335:22:52:13.69
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 335:22:52:14.05
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 335:22:52:15.39
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TABLE II.- STS-44 PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-44-V-01 LiquidOxygen 17-inch 328:15:43G.m.t. The liquid oxygen17-inchmanifoldtemperatureprobe A measurement
_nifold Temperature IPR 45V-0001 operatederraticallyfor i0 minutesbefore failingoff-scalelow. At
ProbeA (V41TI528A) IM 44RF04 approximately328:18:00G.m.t.,the readingsreturnedto near normal
values. At approximately328:18:02:20G.m.t.,another40-secondperiod
of erraticreadingsoccurred,but then recoveredwith no subsequent
anomalousreadings.
KSC: Troubleshootingrequired. Remove and inspectprobe per existing
chit. No ferryimpact.
STS-44-V-02 Video InterfaceUnit Low 328:07:27G.m.t. Video InterfaceUnit (VIU)ser. no. 1009 suppliedpower to the
OutputPower camcorderat a lowerlevel than that requiredby the camcorder (7.2V
shouldbe 7.4 V). The VIU video output is good.
KSC: Ship to JSC. Troubleshootand adjustas required.
STS-44-V-03 TreadmillFailure (GFE) 331:06:54G.m.t. _ile using the treadmill,the crew reportedhearinggrinding sounds,
FIAR BFCE-213F008 followedby the treadmillbelt lockingup. Also, the handle broke off
duringsubsequentusage for the alternateexerciseprogram.
KSC: Ship to JSC FlightEquipmentPackingCenter (FEPC)
STS-44-V-04 OPS Recorder 2 Track 1 330:00:10G.m.t. Data dumps from track 1 were of poor qualityin the reversedirection.
Dump Problem IPR 45V-0005 Quality was betterin the forwarddirection,but still below par. Dump
FIAR BFCE-029F042 problemverifiedat KSC.
0% KSC: Dump, verify problem,removeand ship recorderto JSC.
STS-44-V-05 Humidity Separator Water 332:18:35 G.m.t. The crew reported about 1 to 2 cups of water aroundthe humidity
Car_over separatorscreen,and the humidityseparatorappearedto be spitting
water.
KSC: Water test per existingOMRSD requirement.
STS-44-V-06 SupplyWater Dump Valve 331:19:30G.m.t. Indicationsof a leakingdump valvewere observedafter the secondand
Leak IM-44RF02 fourthwater dumps. In-flightmaintenanceprocedurewas performed
twice to purge the supplywater dump line. Firstattemptindicated
blockage,secondattemptproducedair flow. Normalconfigurationfor
ferry,dump valve closedand isolationvalve open.
KSC: Remove and replacependingresultsof OV-103dump valve test at
JSC.
STS-44-V-07 IMU 2 FailedRedundancy 334:15:30G.m.t. The Z-axis accelerometerchanneland redundantgyro showedexcessive
Management IM 44RF01 outputs (saturation).Taken to standby,then operate,then power
IPR 45V-0006 cycled. Failurewas stillpresent. Unit will be replacedwith a
HAINS unit (set.no. 203).
KSC: Remove and replaceI_. Ship to JSC ISL.
TABLE II.- STS-44PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-44-V-08 ClosedCircuitTelevision 330:00:10G.m.t. Videohad multiplehorizontallinespresenton the screen. Crew
CameraB Degraded FIAR BFCE-029FO41 indicatedpossible focusproblemat end of mission.
KSC: Troubleshootat KSC. Removeand replaceat KSC.
STS-44-V-09 Left Air Data Probe Single 135:22:25G.m.t. Motor 2 (MainB AC 2} apparentlydid not run. SuspectFMCA2 relay,
Motor Deployment wiring,or switchtease. Previousoccurrenceduring groundtesting
KSC: Standard troubleshootingrequired. Reference IPR's36V-0251
and 27RV-0119. Singleand dual motor drive tests scheduled
12/19. If okay,will attemptto duplicate switchtease.
STS-44-V-10 %PU 2 Drain Line Pressure 333:02:14G.m.t. Pressuredecayed from 15.5 psia to 3.7 psia over a 45-minuteperiod.Drop IPR 45V-0009 KSC: R move and eplacerel efvalve. Replacewith a new designof
IM44RF03 the relief valve.
STS-44-V-II APU Drain Line Temperature335:22:10G.m.t. APU 2 drain line temperature2 increasedto 196 °F, then fell to
Rose DuringEntt_ IPR 45V-0010 100 OF. Fault detectionlimitis 195 °F. Suspectwarm slug of fluid.
Normal configurationfor ferry,A and B heaters enabled.
KSC: Test and standardtroubleshooting.
STS-44-V-12 Data DisplayUnit (DDU) FIAR JSC-SD-6053 The vacuumcleaneradapterused for cleaningthe DDU filterbroke at
FilterCleaningTool the joint betweenthe base of the tool and the extensiontube.
-4
Broke Repaired in-flightwith gray tape. Postflightanalysisrevealedthe
threadsin the extensiontube were cut too deep. The STS-42tool will
have the threadscountersunkin the adapterto eliminatethe bending
stressfrom the threads.
STS-44-V-13 HydraulicSystem1 335:21:50G.m.t. Priorityvalve hung up. Required1.04 secondto open and shouldhave
PriorityValve Sluggish IM 44RF05 been instantaneousto a maximumof 1 second.
IPR 45V-0013 KSC: Remove and replacevalve.
STS-44-V-14 Loss of HardwareFrom ET Postlanding An NASA standardinitiator(NSI)with an intactelectricalconnector
umbilicalAttachment IM 44RF06 was foundunderneaththe liquidhydrogenumbilicalcavity after the
System vehiclewas stoppedon the runway. An accountingof debrisin the
containmentsystem indicatesthat a similarpiece of debriswas lost
on-orbit.
STS-44-V-15 Video Tape RecorderDoor 331:21:21G.m.t. The video tape recorde_ (VTR)door jammedand had to be pried open by
Jammed (GFE) FIAR BFCE 029-FO43 the crew. Subsequently,the door couldnot be fully closedunless the
crew forcedthe door down into the closedposition.
TABLE II.- STS-44PROBLEM TRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-44-V-16 PayloadBay Floodlights 335:18:30G.m.t. Duringpayloadbay door closure,the mid-port floodlightflickeredand
Failed to OperateProperlyIM 44RF-08(port) the mid-portstarboardfloodlightfailedto illuminate. Occurredon
IM 44RF-07 (stbd) STS-43 (ReferenceSTS-43-V-10- mid starboardlamp replacedprior to
IPR 45V-0018 STS-44) Retested 12/16 and anomalycould not be reproduced.
STS-44-V-17 MissionSpecialist2 Preflight MissionSpecialist2 repo_tedpostflightthat a pin in the shoulder
ShoulderHarnessWould Not PR MV-0610A-3-0019 harnesstighteningmechanismcame out and tensioncould not be
Tighten IM 44RF-09 maintained. Shoulderbelt was knottedto tightenit.
STS-44-V-18 Hairline cracksin right Postflight Postflightinspectionrevealedtwo cracks (1/2 to 3/4 inch),on right
InboardBrake Rotor PR MEQ-4-11-0417 inboardbrake rotor. All four brakeswere removedand shippedto
• IM 44RF-10 vendor for inspection.
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